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' t 'k e r p  P U iΙο I
Sex & Mysticism in Plato 
John Thorp 
University of Western Ontario
This paper is for presentation at the joint meeting of the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy 
and the American Philological Association, Atlanta, December 27-30, 1994
There is a stark and central tension in Plato's thought. It concerns the grand epistemic 
adventure which he recommends in various language throughout his life, the adventure of 
dialectic, of true philosophy, of coming to know the forms. For there seem to be three 
structurally different pictures offered of what that adventure is.
On the one hand, in the arguments that all undergraduates can repeat by heart, it is a form 
of remembering, anamnesis. It is a priori knowledge, garnered in the preincamation period, 
which does not however lie ready to hand for incarnate people; rather it has to be prompted or 
teased out of forgetfulness. In the Meno and the Phaedo, this knowledge is represented as a fairly 
humdrum affair: everyone can talk about equal sticks, and nearly everyone can sort out some 
elementary truths of geometry. In the Phaedrus, however, this triggering of the memory of the 
forms is represented as a much more exciting, a much more rarely successful, and a much more 
satisfying process: indeed the supreme adventure of human life.
On the second hand, though, another current of thought in Plato seems to represent 
knowledge of the forms as a posteriori, as produced by abstraction from particular sensory 
experiences. Nowhere is this thought clearer, perhaps, than in Diotima's speech in the 
Symposium, where the would-be initiate into the mysteries of love is urged to notice that the 
beauty that is upon one beautiful body is the same as that which is upon another, and ultimately 
that it is the same beauty which infuses bodies, souls, institutions, and sciences. Or again the 
Sophist represents the achievement of philosophy as the summative grasp of the map of the 
forms, possible only after much quiet labour working out the relationship among individual 
forms by the method of division (253 d-e). In the Symposium the process of coming to know the 
forms is represented as the highest experience of which a human being is capable (21 Id); it is 
described in the language of the mysteries, of the epiphany of the divine. In the Sophist on the 
other hand this high language is absent, and the achievement of the philosopher gives a much 
calmer pleasure and satisfaction. This last is the sensible Plato, the Oxford Plato, the Plato who 
thinks that the aim of dialectic is 'to achieve, by means of argument, an understanding of the 
terms, concepts, distinctions or what you will that we employ in thought'1.
On the third hand, however, there is yet another picture of the dialectician's knowledge of 
the forms, and especially the supèrior forms; it is a posteriori knowledge of a very different kind 
— mystical intuition. That is, we do not come to know the form of the good by abstracting it 
from various good things; rather we experience it directly in an intellectual act. Language 
suggesting this picture abounds in the Republic, and the Symposium, and is to be found also, I 
think, in die Seventh Letter. It is a side of Plato which has not, in my view, been taken seriously 
enough in the literature and at which we shall have cause to look more carefully below.
I do not think that there is any very easy way out of this tension, this contradiction. No
doubt it is wise on many grounds to distinguish Plato’s Earlier Dialectic from Plato’s Later
Epistemology, but that distinction will not itself resolve the tension, for chronology cuts across 
it. Anamnesis is, explicitly, a doctrine of the early Phaedo and Meno, but it is also implicitly 
present in the Philebus2, and, in a way, in the theory of the Sophist: language itself contains the 
record of the map of forms, though it has to be teased out (διά γάρ τήν άλλήλων των ειδών 
συμπλοκήν ό λόγος· γέγονεν ήμίν 259e)3. Abstraction is perhaps most clearly described in the
Symposium, but it remains the Platonic tool par excellence from the very early 'What is...?' 
dialogues right through to the Sophist (e.g. 240a). And although one can draw a chronological 
bell curve of mystical excitement in Plato, beginning low in the Phaedo, running to fever pitch 
in the Phaedrus, the Symposium, and the Republic, and going calmer in the late dialogues, still 
certain mystical elements — like the clear segregation of initiates, (philosophers or dialecticians) 
from noninitiates — run throughout.
We cannot, then, resolve the tension by a simple appeal to Plato's development. Nor, I 
think, can we resolve it straightforwardly by distinguishing higher from lower forms — saying, 
for example, that the form of bed or of mud or of hair is learned by abstraction, but the form of 
the Good or Beauty or Being has to be -grasped by mystical intuition. It is true, of course, that 
Plato's most striking mystical language occurs when he is talking about the knowledge of the 
moré important forms; but in the Sophist the culmination of the philosophopher's life-work is 
that of seeing the totality of the forms in their relationship to each other (253d-e). Again, it won't 
do to think that anamnesis will suffice for lower forms like equality but we need mystical 
intuition for the Beautiful; in the Phaedo the anamnesis account is said explicitly to apply to 
beauty, goodness, uprightness, holiness as much as it does to equality (75d).
So a simple distinction between lower and higher forms will not resolve our tension 
either. Nor, indeed, can we hope to do it by importing a distinction between two kinds of 
knowledge, say knowledge as practical use of concepts vs knowledge as contemplation of forms. 
This might be tempting, for the anamnesis doctrine of the Meno or the Phaedo seems pretty 
practical: comparing sticks and doing elementary geometrical proofs, and the mystical passages of 
the Symposium or the Republic seem contemplative. But it will run into the difficulty that the 
hallowed term έπιστήμη is used in both contexts (e.g. Phaedo 75c, Republic 510ff). And it will run 
into the difficulty, also, that the high mystical moments of the Phaedrus are themselves 
represented as moments of recollection, of remembering.
One might, finally, seek an easy resolution of at least some of the tension by downplaying 
the mystical element in Plato, by relegating the high language to the category of myth, and so 
sending it off for consideration under the eternally recurring question of the use that Plato 
intends to make of myth. Indeed, it seems to me, that there is almost a tacit agreement among 
Plato scholars to do just this4. Virtually none of the standard general works on Plato has a 
chapter on Plato's mysticism5, and very few even have index-entries under 'mysticism', and 
where they do they usually flag nothing very substantial — remarks in passing, referring loosely 
to 'mystical elements' in Plato's thought, or to passages of mystical language6. Plato is not, in 
general, taken seriously as a mystic. I think it would be useful to consider whether he should be.
The problem, of course, is that 'mysticism' is itself a vague idea. I think, though, we can 
make some headway with the question by establishing a rough and ready distinction between 
what I shall call soft mysticism on the one hand and hard mysticism on the other7. By soft 
mysticism I mean the indulgence in obscure language, extensive allegory, or extravagant images; 
the suggestion of such language is that what is being expressed is difficult to say otherwise — or 
not permitted to be said otherwise. I have in mind here such things as the visions of Ezekiel, the 
Gospel of John with its impenetrable language about λόγο?, the Apocalypse, or, the newest 
addition to the ancient corpus of mystical literature, the 'Chariots of Glory' scroll from 
Qumran8. The Kabbalah falls into this category, as do the amazing constructions of Marsilio 
Ficino9, and the works of Madame Blavatsky. Many works are softly mystical from beginning to 
end; others have only moments of such soft mysticism — I might instance even Aristotle on 
νοϋ? ποιητικό? or on voC? θύραθεν.
From all this huge and diverse corpus of soft mysticsm I would want to distinguish what I 
shall call hard mysticism, which is the literature of a peculiar and special experience whose 
marks are or include the following: (a) it is the experience of loving union with God or absolute 
reality; (b) it is a direct experience, and it is frequently described in terms of touch or sexual 
union; (c) it is an experience which seems immune from doubt — self-authenticating; (d) 
though one may prepare oneself for it, the experience itself is gratuitous; (e) the experience is 
usually sudden and unannounced, being often described as 'rapture'; (f) it is regarded as the 
highest sort of moment of which human life is capable, and those who have had the experience 
typically devote all their efforts to being able to have it again; (g) it typically requires a long and 
arduous preparation. Readers of the Christian mystical tradition will recognize in these marks 
such mystics as Hildegard of Bingen, Julian of Norwich, Ignatius of Loyola, John of the Cross, 
Theresa of Avila, and many others.
It needs no argument that Plato is at least a soft mystic, and that is what is frequently 
meant when people speak of his mystical passages. He uses allegories, he describes visions, he 
takes over the language of the Mysteries10. The interesting question is whether Plato is also a 
hard mystic. I think that in fact the experience he describes as knowing or contemplating the 
supreme forms exhibits most of the above marks. Let us go through some of the evidence, and 
then think about the implications.
(a) the experience of loving union with God or absolute reality; and (b) direct experience, 
frequently described in terms of touch or sexual union. Let us look at two texts which hold some 
surprises.
Republic 490a7-b7:
TAp’ οϊιν δή ού μετρίω? άπολογησόμεθα δτι πρό? τό δν πεφικώ? εΐη άμιλλασθαι δ γε δντω? 
φιλομαθή?, καί ούκ έπιμένοι έπί τοί? δο£α£ομένοι? είναι πολλοί? έκάστοι?, άλλ’ 1οι καί ούκ 
άμβλύνοιτο ούδ’ άποληγοι του £ρωτο?, πρίν αύτού δ <·στιν έκάστου τη? φύσεω? άψασθαι φ 
προσήκει ψυχή? έφάπτεσθαι του τοιούτου - προσήκει Ôè συγγενεί - φ πλησιάσα? καί μιγεί? 
τφ δντι δντω?, γεννήσα? νουν καί άλήθειαν, γνοίη τε καί άλήθω? £φη καί τρέφοιτο καί 
οδτω λήγοι ώδίνο?, πρίν δ’ οδ;
Will it not be a fair plea in his defense to say that it was the nature of the real lover of 
knowledge to strive emulously for true being and that he would not linger over the many 
particulars that are opined to be real, but would hold on his way, and the edge of his 
passion would not be blunted nor would his desire fail till he came into touch with the 
nature of each thing in itself by that part of his soul to which it belongs to lay hold of that 
kind of reality — the part akin to it, namely — and through that approaching it, and 
consorting with reality really, he would beget intelligence and truth, attain to knowledge, 
and truly live and grow, and so find surcease from his travail of soul, but not before? (tr. 
Shorey11)
This is part of Plato’s description and defence in Book VI of the true philosopher. A number of 
things in this passage are worthy of note. The philosopher strives (άμιλλασθαι) toward being.
What Shorey translates as passion is in Greek Ιρω?: this drawing of the philosopher toward being 
is a matter of love12. And this love is not blunted until the philosopher has laid hold (άψασθαι), 
has touched, the real being of each thing. And notice now that the philosopher approaches 
reality and consorts with it. Jowett translates 'drawing near and mingling and becoming 
incorporate with very being'. Adam in his commentary ad loc. writes 'having come nigh unto 
and married with true being....’ The Greek for consorting, mingling, marrying here is μιγεί?, one 
of whose common meanings is to have sexual intercourse; and indeed that must be its meaning 
here, since we immediately learn that the mingling results in the begetting. Our standard 
translations have erred by indirection: Plato clearly uses the language of sexual intercourse,
sexual possession, to describe the mystical state of union with being. And what about this being? 
Shorey has the soul consort with reality really, though the other two translations take the adverb 
όντως* to qualify δντι: true being, very being. This seems to me a tempting way to take it. And 
what is the ultimate result of this intercourse with the really real? The philosopher άΧήθως* £ώη 
καί τρέφοιτο; the philosopher comes really alive, his life is new.
Republic 500c9-d2:
θείω δή καί κοσμίω ö γε φιλόσοφος δμιλων κόσμιός* re καί θείος* είς* τδ δυνατόν άνθρώπω 
γίγνεται
Then the lover of wisdom associating with the divine order will himself become orderly 
and divine in the measure permitted to man. (tr. Shorey)
Here we have the identification of what it is that the philosopher associates with as divine, and 
as orderly. Being itself, true being, the form of the Good is therefore divine, and it is orderly.
Why orderly? This is aristocratic Greek tidy-mindedness, the deep moral and aesthetic 
preference for having a place for everything and everything in its place13. And what is this 
associating? The verb δμιλέω means to consort with, to frequent, to talk with, to have sexual 
intercourse with. Probably some translation using the word ’intercourse' would be best. It would 
preserve the ambiguity of δμιλών, an ambiguity which Plato's contemporary readers surely heard, 
and which he surely intended.
In other places Plato uses the language not of touch or sexual possession but rather that of 
sight to describe the philosopher's knowledge of the forms (Ιδεΐν, Republic 511al; δράν, 476bl0; 
θεάσθαι., 518cl0; αύγή, 540b7); and of course the whole notion of contemplation which became 
such a topos in antiquity was constructed on the model of vision, θεωρία. Perhaps this is a pity.
(c) the experience seems immune from doubt — self-authenticating.
Famously and infamously, Plato considers that knowledge in the strong sense, knowledge of the 
forms, is infallible (άναμάρτητον, 477e6). A very great deal of scholarly ink has been expended 
over the difficulty of understanding why a dialectical method of enquiry which proceeds by 
making assumptions and testing them should ever be able to yield infallible certainty. In such an 
epistemological approach nothing is ever final, all is subject to question and revision. But the 
difficulty vanishes — I mean the difficulty of interpretation — if we realize that the infallible 
certainty is the product of mystical intuition, and that one of the standard features of this 
experience is precisely the sense of unshakable certainty which surrounds it. The anhypothetical 
principle of knowledge is a different kind of knowing, the product of a mystical experience14.
Just understand that Plato was a mystic, and take him seriously as one, and the long difficulty 
about dialectic and certainty vanishes.
(d) though one may prepare oneself for it, the experience itself is gratuitous. Here, I think, 
is one place where Plato sometimes misses the mark, or one of the marks, of hard mysticism.
For he sometimes writes as though gaining knowledge of the forms is a matter of the exercise of 
will and discipline, and for one who has the discipline, is subject to the will. Thus in the 
Republic, where Plato describes the last stage in the formation of the Rulers, when they have 
reached the age of fifty and have been through all the other tests.
Republic 540a7ff:
άναγκαστέον άνακλίναντας* τήν της* ψυχής* αύγήν είς* αύτδ άποβλέψαι τδ ττάσι φως* παρέχον, 
καί Ιδόντας* τδ άγαθδν αυτό....
We shall require them to tum upward the vision of their souls and fix their gaze on that 
which sheds light on all, and when they have thus beheld the good itself.... (tr. Shorey)
The clear implication is that one one has been through all that preparatory work, one has only to 
turn the eye of the soul to the Form of the Good, and one will see it. The formula Αποβλέπει v et? 
seems to imply that the thing one looks at is a thing one will see (unlike, for example, άποβλέπειν 
πρό?)15. It would indeed be awkward for the ideal state if the mystical experiences which the 
rulers need to run it were entirely gratuitous. For if the tap of knowledge of the forms were to be 
turned off by the gods then the whole assumption on which the elaborate structure of the state is 
built would vanish. On the other hand, a slightly different accent is present in the account of 
this moment of accession to mystical knowledge in the Symposium:
Symposium 210e2ff:
δ? γάρ άν μέχρι ένταυθα πρό? τά έρωτικά παιδαγωγηθή, θεώμενο? έφεξη? τε καί όρθω? τά 
καλά, πρό? τέλο? ήδη Ιών των έρωτικών εξαίφνη? κατόψεταί τι θαυμαστόν τήν φύσιν καλόν, 
τοίιτο έκεΐνο, ώ Σώκρατε?, οΐ δή ένεκεν καί οΐ έμπροσθεν πάντε? πόνοι ήσαν....
Whoever has been initiated so far in the mysteries of Love and has viewed all these 
aspects of the beautiful in due succession, is at last drawing near the final revelation. And 
now, Socrates, there bursts upon him that wondrous vision which is the very soul of the 
beauty he has toiled so long for. (tr. Joyce16)
Here the meaning of κατόψεταί is clearly to see or descry, rather than to look down upon. The 
initiate suddenly (έξαίφνη?) sees Beauty itself. The implication here, unlike in the passage from 
the Republic which we have just examined, is that the looking does not itself guarantee the 
seeing; the seeing is in that measure gratuitous. Nevertheless, it is also implied that whoever 
does the preparatory work correctly, going through all the stages of erotic education in order, will 
be vouchsafed this vision. So in this passage from the Symposium Plato does not suggest that 
one can see Beauty itself at will just by looking at it; but he does seem to suggest that the vision is 
eventually granted to those who have prepared properly.
Symposium 211d8-el
τί δητα, έφη, οΐόμεθα, έί Τφ γένοιτο αύτό τό καλόν ΙδέΙν είλικρινέ?, καθαρόν....
But if it were given to a man to gaze on beauty's very self — unsullied, unalloyed.... (tr. 
Joyce)
Here the use of the phrase γένεσθαι τω suggests passivity and gratuitousness: if it were given to a 
person to have this vision.
(e) the experience is usually sudden and unannounced, being often described as 'rapture' .  
The idea of suddenness is present in the passage we have just considered. But the idea of 
rapture, of being forcibly seized (raped) by the divine is not very prominent in Plato. Two 
passages in the Phaedrus , however, need to be mentioned.
Phaedrus 250a5-bl
όλίγαι δή λείπονται al? τό τη? μνήμη? Ικανω? πάρεσην alrrai δέ, δταν τι των έκει 
δμοίωμα ιδωσιν, έκπλήττονται καί ούκέτ’ έν αίττών γίγνονται, δ δ’ έστι τό πάθο? άγνουσι....
Few indeed are left that can still remember much, but when these discern some likeness 
of the things yonder, they are amazed, and no longer masters of themselves, and know 
not what is come upon them...(tr. Hackforth17)
And then there is the passage at 251a3ff, where the person who sees 'a godlike face or a beautiful 
form’ at once begins to shudder (έφρι£ε), and then καί Ιδρώ? καί θερμότη? άήθη? λαμβάνει — a
strange sweating and fever seize him. But we musn't make too much of these passages, for they 
are, after all, intended as descriptions of the arising of sexual love; what makes them relevant to 
us here is of course that Plato explains the phenomenon of love as an urge to the contemplation 
of the form of Beauty. To feel such love is to be forcibly seized by beauty, or — if the analysis of 
the Phaedrus is correct — to be forcibly seized by the memory of Beauty.
(fl the experience is regarded as the highest sort of moment of which human life is 
capable, and those who have had the experience typically devote all their efforts to being able to 
have it again.
Symposium 211dlff:
ένταδθα του βίου, ώ φίλε Σώκρατε?, έφη ή Μαντινική ξένη, εΧπερ που άλλοθι, βιωτόν
άνθρώπω, θεωμένψ αύτό τό καλόν.
And if, my dear Socrates, Diotima went on, man’s life is ever worth the living, it is when
he has attained this vision of the very soul of beauty, (tr. Joyce)
The text makes the mystical point and the translation masks it: θεωμένφ is present, not perfect, 
and so it should be translated by the present tense. It is the moment of contemplation that makes 
life truly worth living, not the fact of having contemplated. It is clear that having contemplated 
has its other rewards, like the production of true virtue and consequent immortality (212a). And 
the longing of someone who has once had the vision of the forms to do so again is eloquently 
expressed in those well-known passages at the end of Book VII of the Republic, where the rulers 
have to be forced back down into the cave for periods of service.
(g) the experience typically requires a long and arduous preparation. The fifty-year 
strenuous training of the rulers before they can turn their gaze upward (Republic 539-540), and 
the due regimen of toil (πόνοι) in erotics (Symposium 210e) are presented as necessary (and 
perhaps, we saw, sufficient) conditions for being able to experience the supreme forms.
From all of this it seems to me pretty clear that Plato was, in the hard sense, a mystic — or 
at least that he had had some mystical experiences and based a good deal of his thought on 
them— and that we must take this fact into account as we interpret and assess him. His thought 
was formed, in part, by some unusual and exciting theophantic (or ontophantic) adventures that 
few can share. His closed theocratic utopia, which seems repellent to us, is justified very simply 
in his own mind, and rendered understandable to ours, by the sense of infallibility which seems 
to be an unvarying part of mystical experiences. His fantastic construction of an art of erotics as 
the engine of the soul's ascent to mysticism is a real contender if indeed his mystical experiences 
of Beauty happened as he says they did. He keeps company with John of the Cross and 
Marie de l'Incarnation as much as he does with Lucretius or Leibniz. He is not fully a 
philosopher. Why then, we may well wonder, is the history of philosophy a series of footnotes 
to him?
*****
I would now like to open a parenthesis, but an important one, to consider the role of sex 
in Plato's mysticism. Vlastos, in his article 'Love in Plato', and especially in its appendix 'Sex in 
Platonic Love'18 has argued that Platonic love was anything but platonic19; using evidence 
mainly from the Phaedrus, he shows that the lover is, and is broadly expected to be, a sexed, 
sexual, and sexually active person. Nevertheless it would be hard to deny that the general drift of 
this dialogue is that sexual restraint, if not abstinence, is the recommended course. Thus, at 
256alff, we have the celebrated depiction of the pair of lovers lying side by side, desiring sex, and
resisting it and going on thereby to a life of blessed happiness and concord 'for the power of evil 
in the soul has been subjected, and the power of goodness liberated' (tr. Hackforth) (δουλωσάμενοι 
μέν ω κακία ψυχή? έγίγνετο, έλευθερώσαντε? δέ ω άρετή). Nevertheless those who do succumb are 
still counted blessed, even if not as blessed as those who do not (256d). While not a stem or 
implacable attitude toward loving sex, this seems at least to advocate what we might now call 
sublimation: the sexual urge is restrained and its energy passes into other things.
I think the picture in the Symposium is rather different. Before Diotima gets to the 
mystical ascent, and while she is describing the right uses of love (paideia through pederasty), 
she says of the lover who undertakes the education of the beloved:
Symposium 209c2-3
άπτόμενο? γάρ οίμαι του καλού καί δμιλών αύτφ, ä πάλαι έκύει τίκτει καί γεννφ...
...by constant association with so much beauty...he will be delivered of the burden he has 
laboured under all these years (tr. Joyce)
Constant association indeed! άπτομαι has as its general meaning to fasten upon or grasp; one of 
its prominent figurative meanings — found in Plato and Aristotle among others20 — is to have 
sexual intercourse. And we have already seen that όμιλέω means to frequent, to talk with, and to 
have sexual intercourse with (a new slant on homiletics!). Moreover the sexual imagery is 
underlined by the pregnancy and the giving birth that is described in the context. The translator 
has done us a disservice here: Plato's language about the time which the lover and the beloved 
spend together is charged with sexual ambiguity. The right translation would be a word like 
'intercourse', leaving the resolution of the ambiguity to the reader's imagination21.
There is a problem, next, about just what it is that is generated as a result of this love. On 
the one hand it appears to be virtue and wisdom in the beloved youth (209cl). On the other it 
appears to be poetry and the creative arts (209a3; dl), and finally laws and constitutions (209bl, 
d3ff). Is Plato suggesting that homoerotic satisfaction is a necessary condition, or even a frequent 
concomitant, of artistic creativity? Is this gay stereotyping at a very early date (before there was 
even homosexuality)? It may ring true to us, but it is very surprising. Is he suggesting, though 
this sounds much odder to our ears, that homoerotic satisfaction is a condition of legislative 
creativity? Are the best parliamentarians the gay ones? What is perhaps even stranger for us in 
this set of ideas is that the creativity, whether artistic or legislative, happens when erotic desire is 
satisfied; we are very used to the opposite idea, the Freudian idea, that frustrated eros makes 
great artists. These are surprising ideas.
So far, however, we have been considering the hypomystical case, the relatively ordinary 
case of erotic love bearing fruits of the spirit. What about the path of mystical ascent? What role 
is sex to play here?
Symposium 210a4-8
δει γάρ, έφη, τδν όρθω? Ιόντα έπΐ τούτο τό πράγμα άρχεσθαι μέν νέον δντα levai έπΐ τά 
καλά σώματα, καί πρώτον μέν, èàv όρθω? ήγηται δ ήγούμενο?, ένδ? αύτδν σώματος èpâv καί 
ένταϋθα γεννάν λόγου? καλού?, έπειτα....
It is necessary ... for one who proceeds correctly in this matter to begin when young by 
heading for the beautiful bodies; and first, if his guide leads him correctly, he must love 
one body and generate beautiful speeches therein. Next.... (tr. Rosen22)
What is this Ιέναι έπΐ τά καλά σώματα? Jowett memorably translates it as to 'visit beautiful 
forms'. It is striking that the phrase Ιέναι έττί is used twice in the same sentence, presumably 
with different meanings. In the first it means to embark upon a venture (πράγμα); in the second 
it seems more natural to take it to mean to frequent, to keep the company of, some translators 
suggest 'to devote oneself to'. But why τά καλά σώματα? Why the beautiful bodies? Most 
translators have ignored the definite article here. But its presence suggests a far more deliberate 
activity than is suggested if it is not there. Not so much 'frequent beautiful bodies’ as ’go for the 
beautiful ones'. And then another curiosity: who is the guide? Dover23, ad loc., takes it to be the 
lover, the older man of the pair, the erastes. But this would entail one of two unlikely 
interpretations, either that the erastes tries to make the eromenos fall in love with him (not an 
unlikely thing in itself, but a very strange way to express it), or else that the erastes tries to make 
the eromenos fall in love with someone else. Who, then, is the ήγούμενο?? I think the best 
answer here is the one that Bury gave24 ad loc.: the μυσταγωγό?, the spiritual director, if you 
like25. And once we see this we need to become clear as to who the véos* is. It is not, surely, pace 
Dover, the eromenos of the traditional pederastic-paideutic pair; it is rather the young man who 
is himself preparing to fall in love, the one who is about to be an erastes. So the young man 
should keep the company of the attractive youths, so that the constant sight of such beauty will 
spur him to fall in love with one of them, to take a young eromenos. Now this generation of 
beautiful speeches (what an extraordinary idea!) seems the same as what happened in the 
nonmystical love in the last passage we considered. So the approach to mystical love is via 
nonmystical love of the conventional, satisfied homoerotic, arts-and-laws-generating kind. The 
relatively ordinary love which Plato characterizes as spiritually procréant (209a2) is identical 
with the first step in the mystical ascent, and it, we have seen, is a sexually satisfied love.
But what happens then? At 210bl Plato says that having been stirred by beauty to fall in 
love with one person, the aspirant to mystical vision realizes (κατανοήσαι) that beauty of one 
body is related to the beauty of another, and so he loves the one selfsame beauty that is on all 
bodies bodies. He steps, that is, in one leap, from loving one person to loving the beauty of all 
bodies. But a little later, when Diotima reviews the procedure in the peroration of her speech, it 
is put differently.
Symposium 211b5-c5
δταν δή τις άπδ τώνδε διά τδ όρθώ? παιδεραστειν έπανιών έκεΐνο τό καλόν άρχηται καθοραν, 
σχεδόν &ν τι &πτοιτο του τέλους, τούτο γάρ 8ή έστι τό όρθως έπΐ τά έρωτικά Ιέναι ή ύπ’ 
άλλου άγεσθαι, άρχόμενον άπό τώνδε των καλών έκείνου ένεκα του καλού άεΐ έπανιέναι, 
ώσπερ έπαναβασμοΊδ* χρώμενον, άπό ένδ? έπΐ δύο καί άπδ δυοΐν έπΐ πάντα τά καλά σώματα, 
καί άπδ των καλών σωμάτων έπΐ τά καλά έπιτηδεύματα....
...when someone ascending from the previously mentioned stages through the correct 
kind of pederasty begins to see that beauty, he will almost grasp the end. This is the right 
procedure or way of being led by another in erotic matters; beginning from the earlier 
beauties for the sake of this one, he must always ascend, as on the steps of a stair, from one 
to two, and from two to all beautiful bodies; and from beautiful bodies to beautiful 
customs.... (tr. Rosen)
What is striking here is that instead of quickly loving the single selfsame beauty that is in all 
bodies, the aspirant loves one individual beautiful body, then two individual beautiful bodies, 
then all beautiful bodies.... It is only at the end of the procedure that he is portrayed as stepping 
from loving individual beautiful things to loving beauty itself. This point is emphasized, it 
seems to me, by the explicit mention of the stage at which he loves two bodies. The mystic ascent 
requires erotic attention to many individuals before the attention to the universal is possible. In 
a word: erotic promiscuity.
In none of this theory of the Symposium is there any suggestion of sublimated desire. 
Sexual desire, eros, is the engine of ascent, though to be sure it is like a the primary stage of a 
rocket, which falls away when its work is done.
*****
We return now to consider the tension in Plato's epistemology which has driven this 
enquiry. Is the knowledge of the forms a priori, a posteriori by abstraction, or a posteriori by 
mystical intuition? Or are these three in some way compatible?
Phaedrus 249b5-cl
ού γάρ ή ye μήποτε Ιδοΐισα τήν άλήθειαν et? τόδε Αξει τό σχήμα. δεί γάρ άνθρωποι/ συνιέναι 
κατ’ είδο? λεγόμενον, εκ πολλών Ιόν αίσθήσεων εΐ? εν λογισμω συναιρούμενον τοΰτο δ’ 
εστιν άνάμνησι? εκείνων ä ποτ’ εΧδεν ήμών ή ψυχή....
For only the soul that has beheld truth may enter into this our human form — seeing 
that man must needs understand the language of forms, passing from a plurality of 
perceptions to a unity gathered together by reasoning — and such understanding is a 
recollection of those things which our souls beheld aforetime.... (tr. Hackforth)
This passage proposes that recollection is a precondition of abstraction26. The problem is, of 
course, that if you already have the idea of beauty, you do not need to perform abstractions to 
achieve it. On the other hand, if you do not already have the idea of beauty, it is hard to see how 
you manage to group together beautiful things in order to abstract the idea. The solution to this 
part of the tension, which is an old sophistic argument, surely lies in distinguishing clarities of 
knowledge. One may dimly remember a form, just enough to do some grouping and abstracting; 
but the grouping and abstracting clarifies the form remarkably27.
And can knowledge be both by abstraction and by mystical intuition? This is surely the 
whole problem of the unhypothetical principle, the problem of how a method of enquiry and 
concept-construction should end in certain and infallible knowledge. I have already urged the 
solution which lies in seeing the mystical knowledge not as a sure product generated logically by 
the method, but rather the method as a preparatory exercise upon whose completion the 
mystical intuition may or may not supervene. (Plato is not unfailingly helpful to me here, since, 
as we noted above, he sometimes writes as though mystical intuition is a sure-fire result of the 
preparatory work.)
And finally, can we reconcile knowledge of the forms as recollection with knowledge of 
the forms as mystical intuition? Prima facie, it would seem not, for the one is a priori and the 
other a posteriori. Mystical experience is normally cast as a fresh and absolutely true and valid 
contact with being itself; not a contact with a remembered image of being. Plato, to my 
knowledge, does not consider this problem, does not help us to resolve this tension. But I think 
there is a way to soften it. The distinction between a priori knowledge — knowledge which we 
have independently of experience — and a posteriori knowledge — which we have only on the 
basis of experience — seems a firm one as long as the experience in question is sensory 
experience. But if we recall that mystical experience is for Plato an intellectual experience, the 
distinction softens. If I learn and know the classical quadratures of lunes, and then call them to 
mind again, am I not knowing them afresh? Does not the distinction between knowledge and 
remembered knowledge quickly blur when the knowledge in question is not sensory but 
intellectual?
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